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Introduction
Advertising and innovation are two engines for firms to escape competition through a quality advantage or a better attraction power toward consumers. The aim of this paper is to study the joint decision for R&D and advertising efforts of firms according to the competitive environment.
This issue is related to distinct literatures that analyze the relations between competition and, on the one hand R&D, or on the other hand, advertising, and the connections between advertising and R&D. Though in-depth firm-level empirical investigations are relatively scarce, it seems well established that a more competitive environment induces firms to advertise more (see Bagwell 2005 for a review on advertising). Advertising enables to acquire a reputation or to publicize a better quality, intensity in innovation or even fashionableness of products or services. It has clear positive consequences on firm revenues or profits. Aghion et al. (2005) summarize, in a unified framework, classic arguments of the controversy Schumpeter versus Arrow. They show an "escape competition" effect of R&D, whereby competition exerts pressure on firms to spend in R&D in order to strengthen their technological and market position. But when it is too harsh, it challenges incentives to innovate.
The interplay between R&D and advertising is more ambiguous. If the returns associated to advertising are higher than returns on R&D, favoring advertising may induce a substitution and thus a reduction of the R&D effort. This mechanism should be strengthened when firms face credit constraints or have to compel with short-run objectives. But, advertising and R&D may be complements. Advertising should be associated with improving quality, since a famous firm is reluctant to lose its reputation by offering an odd or outdated product (Fogg-Meade 1901) . Advertising may be more efficient if the firm proposes innovative or less costly goods or services (Nelson 1974, Fluet and Garella 2002) .
New opportunities of advertising may help to improve the information of consumers on the true quality of firms output, favouring ex ante incentives to improve quality. Advertising may also generate short-term rents that help to finance long-run investments including through R&D. These arguments provide explanations for the high advertising spending in some R&D intensive sectors, like drugs (Matraves) . In addition, Grossmann (2008) argues that advertising also increases sunk costs and makes entry more difficult. This in turn induces higher market concentrations with larger firms and enhances R&D investments of insider firms-since R&D is more profitable to large firms that are able to spread R&D costs over higher sales-. However, we can reverse the argument: if incumbents are more innovative firms, barriers generated by advertising may reduce the global R&D effort.
Our paper extends these strands of literature: we build a model that encompasses both the static and dynamic interactions between R&D, advertising and competitive environment. The model is composed of two blocks, a static one and a dynamic one. In a given sector, we consider two firms that compete on a market composed of a continuum of consumers. Two shares of the latter have a preference for the product from each firm. The lower these shares, the lower the differentiation, the higher the proportion of undecided consumers and then the larger the room for price competition between the duopolists.
The two firms could use costly advertising to convince undecided consumers. The sector is either leveled -both firms are technologically Neck-and-Neck and thus have a similar quality level (and production costs) -or unleveled -one firm being a quality leader and the other one a quality follower. In order to introduce a dynamic trade-off between innovation and preference advantages for firms, this first block of the model is plugged into a quality ladder version of the Aghion et al. (2005) framework. It allows us to endogenize the relationships between competition, advertising and R&D decisions.
Our model provides two main predictions and a conditional prediction. First, for a given competitive environment, quality leaders spend more in advertising than Neck and Neck firms or quality followers; they extract maximal rents from their twofold monopolist positions (in preferences and in quality). There is thus a dynamic complementarity between current advertising and past R&D efforts that stochastically determines the innovation position of the firms. Second, more competition pushes Neck and Neck firms to advertise more in order to attract the larger share of consumers on their products or services. More generally, endogenizing the state of a sector leveled versus unleveled yields a positive monotonic relationship between competition toughness and advertising expenditures when cost of ads is moderate. Third, in this case, a lower cost of advertising may stimulate R&D.
Using a large unbalanced panel of around 59,000 French firms over the 1990-2004 period, we test most of these assertions. The Centrale des Bilans database from the Banque de France provides very detailed data on firm performance and firm expenditures or investments including R&D and advertising. Within sectors, most productive firms seem to spend more in advertising. Similarly, current advertising spending is positively correlated to past R&D efforts. These results are consistent with a dynamic complementarity between R&D and advertising. Estimations also support the monotonic impact of competition on advertising.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic theoretical static framework. Section 3 introduces the dynamic R&D process and studies the impact of advertising costs on the flows of innovation. Our main predictions are then derived analytically from this model. Section 4 provides a description of the data and presents our main empirical findings. Section 5 concludes with directions for further research.
Static theoretical framework
This section presents a static theoretical framework to capture the basic connections between competition and advertising for a given technological level of firms. The dynamic interaction with R&D will be dealt with in section 3.
Basic market structure: quality and captive consumers
We consider markets as duopolies with firms A and B producing differentiated goods or services. The market can be in a Neck and Neck situation where there is no quality gap between A and B or in an unleveled situation where a quality leader (say A) and a follower (say B) coexist.
In the leader-follower case, the leader enjoys a quality gap for similar production costs c: it produces goods with a better quality with a given hedonic factor 1 + . Let x andx denote respectively the volume and the hedonic volume; let p andp be respectively the price and the hedonic price.
Without loss of generality, in the Neck and Neck case, x A =x A , x B =x B , p A =p A and p B =p B . In the leader-follower case, if for example A is the leader:x A = x A (1 + ),
x B =x B ,p A = p A /(1 + ) and p B =p B . Note that we have always px =px.
We assume that also represents the ex ante valuation advantage firms have on specific consumers. These consumers have an initial preference for the goods from A or B.
Examples include the wine vs. beer US market of alcohol: recent Gallup polls show that upper-class male Americans that are above 45 and very fond of European culture give a prominent place to wine whereas less well-to-do and younger drinkers favor beer. In-between these two categories, people may be classified as indifferent. Segmentation of consumers can also come from geographic constraints, e.g. customers prefer to buy in stores located in their neighborhood. Similarly, artistic professions favor Mac computers whereas scientific professions are more inclined to buy PC, with a priori neutral users in between. We formalize this ex ante inclination of consumers by the existence of segments of captive consumers. The size of these segments is inversely proportional to the degree of competition. To escape competition on the non captive segments, firms can advertise to attract a share of the initially neutral consumers, but also some consumers that ex ante prefer the other good.
Consumers
Consider a continuum of consumers of mass one indexed by i. Their utility follows:
where x ij is the aggregate of two perfect substitutes A and B from two firms on the market j defined by :
Bj where k ij takes value in {−1, 0, 1}. We assume that firms can discriminate consumers according to their ex post preferences.
Without advertising
On each market, without loss of generality, consumers can be aligned on the segment 
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the distribution of preferences.
The log-preference assumption made in the first equation implies that individuals spend the same amount on each basket x j . We normalize this common amount to unity by 
The demand function facing firm B is trivially obtained by inverting A and B in the expression above. We drop the j subscript in the remaining of the text.
With advertising
Assume now that firms are given the opportunity to advertise their product. Advertising is viewed as a mean of modifying consumers' preferences by affecting their marginal rate of substitution; ie. ads are persuasive and informative. We model advertising according to the following stylized assumptions:
H1a: If a consumer receives ads from only one firm, she will prefer the product of this firm.
H1b: If a consumer receives ads from the two firms, she comes back to her ex ante preferences.
H2a: Each firm chooses a certain probability q A (resp q B ) to reach a consumer by advertising. Firms cannot target their ads; This is consistent with the fact that advertising expenditures are primarily in general media (Bagwell, 2005) .
H2b: Each firm incurs a cost proportional to q, say φq for advertising, with /2 < φ < .
As is small, we work at first order terms in from herein. Consequently: (1 + ) 2 = 1 + 2 , 1/(1 + ) = 1 − and 1/(1 + ) 2 = 1 − 2 . Chart 2 sums up the marginal rate of 
Firms: equilibrium prices and profits

Without advertising
Firms use labor as the only input, according to a constant-return production function, and take the wage rate as given. The cost of producing one unit of non-hedonic quantity of good is the same for both firms and is denoted c. This unit cost of production c of the two firms in an industry is independent of the quantities produced.
Firms are supposed to be able to price discriminate consumers according to their ex post preferences. They may use for example price promotion for new clients or fidelity cards.
Duopolies compete in prices for each consumer, arriving at a Bertrand equilibrium. We now derive the explicit form of prices and profits depending on the technology configuration of the market.
Throughout the text, subscript 1 will refer to the leader, subscript -1 to the follower, whereas subscript 0 refers to Neck and Neck firms.
a) leveled sector
In this case, firms are Neck and Neck and production costs are equal for similar quality.
On I 0 , due to Bertrand competition, firms will trivially set their price equal to their cost c and make no profit. On I A , firm A will use its comparative advantage and choose the maximum price such as firm B cannot steal the market I A from A without making a negative profit. That is, p A,I A = c × (1 + ). Firm B acts on I B as A on I A and gets this market.
The infinitesimal profit made on each i
if i chooses to buy firm A's good. Finally the overall profit flow of firms A and B in the neck and neck case is:
In this second case, one of the two firms is leader and has a hedonic quality advantage equal to 1 + . Without loss of generality, we assume that when the sector is unleveled, 
With advertising
The equilibrium prices and profits depend on the amount of advertising realized by each firm which is function of the cost of advertising φ. We have again to separate the two states of the sector. This framework covers two main views of advertising. In an unleveled sector, ads help the leader to provide information to neutral consumers and thus to expand its profitable market share. In a leveled sector, both firms use ads to challenge the market positions.
a) leveled sector
Firms A and B are Neck and Neck. They choose their probability q A and q B to reach a consumer. Their game is formally similar to a mixed-strategy game with q = 0 and q = 1 the pure strategies. So, their choices are also the mixed Nash equilibrium of this latter game. On its ex ante captive segment, firm A can sell above its marginal cost only to consumers that have not received an ad from B or that have received ads from both firms. Its sales profits are then f (1 − q B + q B q A ). Similarly, profits of A on the central segment are (1 − 2f ) (q A − q B q A ) and on the B captive segment f (q A − q B q A ).
The profits of A are then π
that A chooses a mixed strategy; the support of this strategy is q A = 0 and q A = 1.
Consequently the Nash mixed strategy for B is q B such that (
Therefore, we have to distinguish 2 cases:
-if (1 − f ) < φ < , then the Nash equilibrium is the symmetric strategy:
We first prove that the follower has no interest to advertise. Assume that the follower makes some ads q > 0. By construction, its ads are more efficient when the leader does not advertise 1 . Take this case: the follower convinces a share q of consumer; however, the follower has to adjust its hedonic price to a level for which the technological leader makes no profits i.e. c; so the follower makes also no sales profits and incurs a cost φq > 0 for advertising. So even in the most favorable case for the follower, the profits of the follower are negative when q is positive. Consequently, the follower advertising probability is q −1 = 0 and its profit is Π −1 = 0. Now consider the leader. It chooses a level of advertising q in order to maximize its profits. The leader's net revenue is 2f on its ex ante captive segment; (1−2f )(2 q+ (1−q)) on the ex ante neutral segment; and 2f q on the ex ante captive segment of the follower.
This implies:
Now because > φ, the leader maximizes its profits when q = q 1 = 1 i.e. Π 1 = 2 − φ. Table 1 summarizes these results and figure 3 depicts the leader's and Neck and Neck's advertising levels when f varies between 0 and 1/2 and φ = 0.6 . Note that Π 0 being equal to f or to the product of two positive functions that are increasing with f is increasing with f.
We have thus the following property:
Property 1: Advertising expenditures increase with the quality advantage of firms: the quality leader advertises more than the follower and the Neck and Neck; and the Neck and Neck advertises more than the follower. 
Follower Leader Neck&Neck
Without ads:
With Ads:
Intuitively, because it faces lower production costs, the quality leader has interest to try to capture both ex ante neutral and unfavorable segments. In addition it does not face the advertising competition of its competitor. So it advertises more than Neck and Neck firms for a given level of competition f . Neck and Neck firms advertise more than followers who do no advertise since they lose money if they do.
Property 2: For a given state of the sector (leveled or unleveled) advertising expenditures are increasing with competition. More precisely, q 0 is decreasing with f and q −1 and q 1 are constant.
Intuitively, when competition is tougher i.e. the ex-ante non-captive markets are large, all firms try to escape competition through an increase in their advertising effort. Now, computing the aggregated levels of advertising for different degrees of competition and so to determine the relation between advertising and competition requires to determine the proportion of leveled and unleveled sectors for a given degree of competition. The R&D cost of firm moving one quality step ahead with a Poisson hazard rate of n is n 2 /2. We call n the "innovation rate" or "R&D intensity" of the firm. We assume that a follower firm can move one step ahead with hazard rate h even if it spends nothing on R&D, by copying the leader's technology. Thus n 2 /2 is the R&D cost of a follower firm moving ahead with a hazard rate n + h. Each innovation step changes the competitive environment and thus cancels the effect of past advertising on consumers' preferences.
Dynamics of R&D investment and innovations
Bellman equations
We now derive general equations for R&D investments. Let V denote the steady state value of the firm. We have the following Bellman equations:
The annuity value rV 1 of currently being a quality leader in an industry with gap 1 at date t equals the current profit flow Π 1 minus the current R&D cost n 2 1 /2, plus the expected capital loss (n −1 + h)(V 0 − V 1 ) from having the follower catch up with the leader. Similar arguments lead to equations for the value of a follower and a neck and neck firm.
Given that profitability is only dependent on the gap between leader and follower, no innovation will be undertaken by the leader i.e. n 1 = 0. Now, using the fact that each firm chooses its own R&D intensity to maximize its current value, i.e. to maximize the RHS of the corresponding equation, we obtain the first order conditions:
According to these first order conditions, an increase in market competition diminishes profits of a leveled firm, and consequently its market value V 0 decreases. Hence, one could expect that an increase in market competition leads to an increase in n 0 and a decline in n −1 .
Equations (1) and (2) solve for n 0 and n −1 . Eliminating the V 's between these equations yields the reduced form R&D equations:
This system is recursive, as the first equation solves for n 0 , and then given n 0 the second equation solves for n −1 .We obtain:
Using equation (3) to substitute (r + h + n 0 ) 2 in equation (4) yields the alternative expression:
The R&D investment n 0 of a Neck and Neck firm is increasing in ( This is captured by the presence of n 0 in equation (5): n −1 is decreasing 2 in n 0 .
The innovation rate of a sector is 2n 0 if the sector is leveled and n −1 if the sector is unleveled. But the average innovation rate of a sector in steady state also depends on the fraction of time a sector spends being leveled or unleveled. Formally, let µ 1 (resp. µ 0 ) denote the steady state probability of being an unleveled (resp. neck and neck) industry.
During any unit time interval, the steady state probability that a sector moves from being unleveled to leveled is µ 1 (n −1 + h), and the probability that it moves in the opposite direction is 2µ 0 × n 0 . In steady state, these two probabilities must be equal:
Because µ 1 + µ 0 = 1, this implies that the average flow of innovation is: Figure 4 illustrates that when the competitive environment is harsh (f small), a firm facing even more competition reduces current R&D but increases current advertising. However, this mechanism driven by competition does not mean that advertising and R&D are substitute. Actually, the static results still hold:
Competition and advertising
for a given competitive environment, innovative firms advertise more and firms innovate more when advertising is possible.
Advertising costs and R&D
Because of the interplay between R&D and advertising, changes in the advertising regulation or technologies may alter advertising costs and thus R&D. In other words, the less expensive advertising is, the more R&D. This is true for any degree of competition, that is for any given value of f between 1 − φ/ and 1. Figure 5 shows from simulations how I varies when f and φ vary. We can observe that I is inverted U shape as a function of f (on the x axis) and increases a lot when the cost of advertising is decreased from φ = = 0.05 to φ = /2 = 0.025 (y axis). 
Data
We use a subset of the FIBEN dataset provided by the Observatoire des entreprises R&D costs concerning a well defined project and yielding almost certain return can be declared as investments whereas R&D expenditures linked to more uncertain projects have to be considered as current expenditures. In this paper, we add these two categories together.
A Lerner index for each firm can be built using these data. We only observe sectoral price provided by the INSEE, but we have detailed information on costs. The Lerner index is supposed to measure the market power of the firm by the difference between price and marginal costs (which equals the negative inverse of demand elasticity). Since neither price nor marginal costs are available at the firm level, we compute the index using value-added net of depreciation and provisions minus the financial cost of capital Lerner indicators. 4 In our model the Lerner index is decreasing with f , the measure of competition.
Using measures of capital stocks in volume that account for differences in the average age of capital 5 , we compute a total factor productivity index (TFP ) for each firm based on a revenue function. TFP is computed as the ratio of value added over a Cobb-Douglas combination of labor and capital, where the parameter for labor is firm specific, taken as the time average of the share of the wage bill in value added and the parameter of the capital stock equals one minus the parameter of labor. Note that in our model, all firms have the same technology (same c) but the leader (say firm A) can set higher prices than Neck and Neck firms on I B and I 0 due to hedonic advantage. Hence, on average, leaders enjoy higher TFP, based on a revenue function than Neck and Neck firms. 
Results
Raw statistics are consistent with the model. Figure 6 plots the average of R&D and advertising efforts as a function of the 20-ciles of firm lerners. R&D effort appears inverted U-shaped in the measure of competition whereas average advertising is clearly increasing with competition.
Two key predictions of the model can also be statistically tested. First, our model 5 FIBEN includes balance sheet data only; namely, the value of physical assets that it reports is given at historical costs. Using standard methods based on the depreciation rate, we estimate the average age of capital to adjust for this price effect. Tables 3 and 4 test the second prediction. In order to identify potential leaders, we first make the reasonable assumption that leaders enjoy a better total factor productivity (TFP). Table 2 shows that higher TFP (coincident or lagged) is correlated with higher advertising. Assuming that the technological position can also be described by cumulative past R&D efforts, we build a rough proxy for a R&D stock by adding R&D expenditures over the past 4 years. The average R&D stock is around 950 Euros per employee. Table 4 shows that higher lagged R&D stock per employee is correlated with higher advertising. Unsurprisingly, the relationship between current R&D stock and advertising is much more blurred, since this former includes current R&D expenditures which should and Neck and Neck crucially depend on the degree of competition, which makes the overall corelation theoretically unclear. Our data are consistent with this result: the empirical corelation between current R&D and current advertising efforts is negative but non robust.
Conclusion
We have studied the interactions between competition, R&D and advertising through a static and a dynamic frameworks. Empirical evidence using a large dataset on French firms supports the two main predictions of our theoretical model: First, advertising efforts are increasing with competition. Second, qualitative leaders spend more on advertising;
intuitively, leaders enjoy higher advertising returns by capturing the segment of neutral consumers and those who ex ante prefer the follower products. This last result suggests that the lower the cost of advertising the higher the incentive of becoming a leader. As a consequence, reduced advertising cost may improve innovation. An extension of this paper will be to investigate such mechanism. Empirically, this would require identifying structural reforms impacting advertising costs or technological shocks. The emergence of massive advertising on internet would offer a relevant natural experiment when data will be available.
The proof proceeds in 4 steps: 1) If the R&D efforts n 0 and n 1 are both decreasing with φ, then the total flow of innovation I is also decreasing with φ.
2) n 0 is decreasing with φ.
3)
∂n 0 ∂φ and
∂φ have the same sign as soon as n 0 > n −1 . 4) n 0 (f = 1/2) > n −1 (f = 1/2) and n 0 is decreasing with f whereas n −1 is increasing with f . Thus n 0 > n −1 for all f ∈ [0, 1/2]. 1), 2), 3) and 4) clearly imply that I is decreasing with φ, that is, reducing the cost of advertising increases the R&D effort. For values of φ between /2 and , Π 1 is decreasing with φ whereas Π 0 is increasing or constant with φ. This implies that Π 1 − Π 0 is decreasing with φ. From equation 3, n 0 is decreasing with φ.
Proof of 1):
Proof of 3):
Differentiating equation 2 with respect to φ gives: n −1 n −1 + (r + h + n 0 )n −1 + n −1 n 0 − n 0 n 0 = 0
Proof of 4):
The fact that n 0 is decreasing with f and n −1 increasing with f are prooven in the proof of property 3. When f = 1/2, q 0 = 0 and Π 0 = f = /2 whereas Π 1 = 2 − φ remain independent of f . Π 1 − Π 0 = 3 /2 − φ. Π 1 − Π −1 = 2 − φ. 
